Data-Driven Safety Verification of Cyber-Physical Systems



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Motivation and Contribution

Cyber-physical systems (CPS) become pervasive
Many CPS are safety-critical, making it paramount to ensure their safe operation

 $g_{1}(x_{i}) = -\mathbf{N}_{b}(x_{i}) - \eta, \qquad \forall x_{i} \in X$ $g_{2}(x_{i}) = \mathbf{N}_{b}(x_{i}) - \gamma - \eta, \qquad \forall x_{i} \in X_{0}$ $g_{3}(x_{i}) = -\mathbf{N}_{b}(x_{i}) + \lambda - \eta, \qquad \forall x_{i} \in X_{u}$ $g_{4}(x_{i}) = \mathbb{E}\left[\mathbf{N}_{b}(f(x_{i}, \mathbf{N}_{c}(x_{i}), w) \mid x)\right] - \mathbf{N}_{b}(x_{i}) - \eta, \forall x_{i} \in X \setminus X_{u}$

• The majority of CPS are influenced by noise and uncertainty

• Models of CPS are either unknown or too complex to be of any use

CPS Models

A discrete-time stochastic control system (dt-SCS) is a tuple $S = (X, U, V_m, w, f)$ where:

• $X \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n$ and $U \subseteq \mathbb{R}^m$ are the sets of state and input, respectively.

• w is a sequence of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables on uncertainty space V_m .

• $f: X \times U \times V_m \to X$ is the state transition map such that: $x(t+1) = f(x(t), u(t), w(t)), \quad \forall t \in \mathbb{N}.$

Safety Problem

Consider a dt-SCS S, where the map f and the probability distribution of w are unknown. Consider a safety specification denoted by $\Psi = (X_0, X_u)$. System S is called safe with respect to Ψ , denoted by $S \models \Psi$, if all trajectories of S started from the initial set $X_0 \subset X$ under a control policy C, never reach unsafe set $X_u \subset X$.

Safety Verification of dt-SCS

(2) Replacing the expectation term in g_4 with its empirical mean by using i.i.d. samples $w_j, j \in \{1, \ldots, \hat{N}\}$, for each pair of $(x_i, u_i), i \in \{1, \ldots, N\}$. Hence:

$$\bar{g}_4(x_i) = \frac{1}{\hat{N}} \sum_{j=1}^{\hat{N}} \mathbf{N}_b(f(x_i, \mathbf{N}_c(x_i), w_j)) - \mathbf{N}_b(x_i) + \delta - \eta, \, \forall x_i \in X \setminus X_u$$

where η is a negative robustness parameter ensuring that conditions in (a)-(c) are strongly satisfied, $\delta > 0$ is defined for the empirical mean approximation, and $\mathbf{N}_c(x_i)$ is bounded within U.

Correctness Guarantee of Neural Networks

Theorem 2: Correctness Guarantee

Consider a dt-SCS S and a safety specification $\Psi = (X_0, X_u)$. Assume that all constraints g_1, g_2, g_3, \bar{g}_4 are Lipschitz continuous with respect to pair (x, u), with a Lipschitz constant \mathcal{L} . Suppose $\hat{N} = \frac{\hat{M}}{\delta^2 \beta}$ for some $\delta > 0$ and $0 < \beta < 1$, where \hat{M} is the upper bound for $\operatorname{Var}(\mathbf{N}_b^*(f(x, \mathbf{N}_c^*(x), w))) \leq \hat{M}$ for trained neural networks \mathbf{N}_b^* and \mathbf{N}_c^* and for all $x \in X$. Collect N data pairs (x_i, u_i) with a quantization parameter ϵ . If $\mathcal{L}\epsilon + \eta \leq 0$, then $\mathbb{P}\left\{\mathcal{S}_{\mathbf{N}_c^*} \models \Psi\right\} \geq 1 - \frac{\gamma}{\lambda}$ with a confidence of at least $1 - \beta$.

Definition 1: Control Barrier Certificate

Consider a dt-SCS S and a safety specification Ψ . Function $B: X \to \mathbb{R}^+_0$ is called a control barrier certificate (CBC) for S if there are constants $0 < \gamma < \lambda$ and a feedback controller $C: X \to U$ such that:

$B(x) \le \gamma,$	$\forall x \in X_0,$	(a)
$B(x) \ge \lambda,$	$\forall x \in X_u,$	(b)
$\mathbb{E}\big[B(f(x, C(x), w)) \mid x\big] \le B(x),$	$\forall x \in X \backslash X_u.$	(c)

Theorem 1: Safety Probability


Let S be a given dt-SCS with a safety specification Ψ . Suppose there is a CBC B and its associated controller C for the system S. Then, one gets $\mathbb{P} \{ S_C \models \Psi \} \ge 1 - \frac{\gamma}{\lambda}$, where S_C represents the dt-SCS Scontrolled by C.

Data-driven Synthesis of CBC

Finding a CBC B and its corresponding controller C for a dt-SCS S is not possible, since the map f and the probability distribution of w

Case Study

Consider a dt-SCS of an inverted pendulum with additive zero-mean Gaussian noise (standard deviation = 0.01). Assume $X = \left[-\frac{\pi}{4}, \frac{\pi}{4}\right]^2$, $X_0 = \left[-\frac{\pi}{15}, \frac{\pi}{15}\right]^2$, $X \setminus X_u = \left[-\frac{\pi}{5}, \frac{\pi}{5}\right]^2$, and U = [-10, 10]. The parameters are set to $\beta = 0.001$, $\gamma = 1$, $\lambda = 25$, $\hat{N} = 100$, $\delta = 2$, and $\epsilon = 0.00157$. The neural network \mathbf{N}_b comprises 100 neurons across each of the 5 hidden layers, while \mathbf{N}_c consists of 25 neurons in each of its 3 hidden layers, with learning rates of $l_{r_b} = 10^{-4}$ and $l_{r_c} = 10^{-3}$, respectively. Then, we obtain $\mathbb{P} \{S_{\mathbf{N}_c} \models \Psi\} \ge 0.96$ with a confidence of at least 99.76%.



are unknown.

(1) Considering CBC *B* and Controller *C* as two separate neural networks, $\mathbf{N}_b : \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R}_0^+$ and $\mathbf{N}_c : \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R}^m$, respectively. Then, collection of sample pairs $(x_i, u_i), i \in \{1, \dots, N\}$, from the sets of state and input, and also defining the loss function:

 $L = \sum_{\ell=1}^{4} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \operatorname{ReLU}(g_{\ell}(x_i)),$

The constructed CBC over X (left) and the γ -level of CBC (right).

References

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